Wikipedia describes systematization as "a program of urban planning carried out under Nicolae Ceausescu's communist regime". After a visit to North Korea in 1971, Ceausescu was favorably impressed by the effectiveness of the personality cult in controlling and keeping an iron grip on the population. He was also pleased with the urban planning that catered to ideological mobilization. In the same year, Ceausescu further embellished the patina of his democratic socialism by appointing himself President of Romania. In his extremely readable Romania: Borderland of Europe, Lucian Boia describes the North Korean influence on Ceausescu:
As President, he appeared like a monarch, with a sceptre in his hand (to the enthusiasm of Salvador Dali, who sent him a congratulatory telegram-- the whole thing was surrealistic indeed!). Then, Elena Ceausescu climbed the ladder of power to become number 2 in the Party....
The Romanian model ended up close to that of North Korean dynastic communism... In its interpretation of history and in the justification for its political actions, Communism puts the masses in the foreground: everything happens through the people and for the people. But in fact, the masses are represented by the Party; and the Party by its leaders. Everywhere, the Communist leadership became personalized to an appreciable, though of course varying, degree. All the Romanians and the North Koreans did was to take the final step. A closed system in which decisions were taken at the top by a restricted group permitted, and indeed almost encouraged, such a shift.
In 1974, Ceausescu applied systematization to destroy and reconstruct existing villages, towns, and cities with the goal of turning Romania into his favorite mysticism, "a multilaterally developed socialist society". According to a country study on Romania:
An especially controversial aspect of systematization was the theory
that concentrating the rural population would promote more efficient use
of agricultural land. New housing in rural areas after 1974 was subject
to strict regulations. Villages were to be structured like towns, with
construction of housing concentrated within specified perimeters. The
buildings had to be at least two stories high, and surrounding lots were
restricted to 250 meters. Private lots for agriculture were to be moved
outside the settlement perimeter, diminishing the ability of the village
populations to produce their own food, as they were required by law to
do after 1981. Moreover, because private plots produced much of the
nation's fruits, vegetables, and meat, full implementation of
systematization would have jeopardized the food supply for the entire
country.
The international community, particularly Hungary and West Germany,
criticized systematization as a blatant attempt to forcibly assimilate
national minorities. Each village escaping systematization was to have a
civic center, often referred to as a "Song to Romania House of
Culture." These institutions promised to be useful tools for
indoctrination and mobilization and were apparently intended to replace
churches as the focal point of community life. By 1989 many churches had
already been destroyed, and no plans for rebuilding were evident. The
destruction of churches and villages not only severed cultural and
historic links to the past, but also threatened community bonds and
group autonomy. Much of the international criticism of systematization
deplored the investment in such a grandiose scheme amidst rapidly
deteriorating living conditions, which had been on a downward spiral
since the 1970s. The Victory of Socialism Boulevard was replete with
irony as the 1980s witnessed serious food shortages and an energy crisis
that prolonged the disparity between urban and rural Romania.
The trigger for systematization in Bucharest was the huge earthquake of 1977 (my father had to take my mother down the stairs over his shoulder because she refused to leave behind her blue jeans and Kents). Apparently, the earthquake mostly struck buildings and objects built prior to World War II, while the structures dating from the communist period held out well. Ceausescu's regime naturally interpreted this as proof of communist superiority to pre-war regimes, thus paving the way for a paradigm shift in its urban development policy. Wapedia provides the details:
The immediate consequences of this new urban policy were the
demolition of monuments like Enei
Church (founded 1611, rebuilt 1723; with murals by
Gheorghe Tattarescu), the
Neo-gothic Casa
Cerchez or the elegant Baia Centrală public bath house and the suppression of
the Authority for the National Patrimony. However, the most
pervasive consequence was the commitment of Ceauşescu to accomplish
his earlier vision of the monumental Centrul Civic ("civic centre"),
which would concentrate and symbolise the emblems of his power.
Ceausescu's systematization scorned traditional architecture, culture, and history with its nihilistic attempt to start society from scratch. Many Romanians were livid. In fact, Wapedia even defines the word Ceausima as a Romanian vernacular linkage of Ceausescu to Hiroshima "coined in the 1980's to describe the huge urban areas of Bucharest torn down on the orders of President Ceausescu, comparing the results with the nuclear attack on Hiroshima".
Some believe that the failure of systematization was a contributing factor to the violent end of the Ceausescu regime in 1989. As I nod my head to agree, I can still remember the Romanian exile community in the 1980's complaining about the demolition of special churches and buildings in Bucharest. Whispers about Ceausescu being a Satanist or planning to cryogenically freeze his body-- because anything is possible in a person who lacks the European respect for the past.
Ceausescu made a huge mistake-- he bet on national socialism, but then he tried to do away with the national heritage he previously deified. Every good dictator knows you can't erase the physical carriers of national mythology without opening the doors for other Gods, histories, and versions of truth. Ultimately, systematization failed because Ceausescu invested too heavily in the national mythos to explain his break from the Warsaw Pact. This investment in "cultural patrimony" required him to keep a solid eye on the past and a devout reverence for tradition-- neither of which was compatible with the construction of a new socialist man.
More on this thread:
[Credit for images goes to Bukres Blog.]
